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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
MICHAEL TODD McARTHUR, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 981421-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from convictions for burglary and theft, 
both second degree felonies, entered after defendant entered 
guilty pleas pursuant to State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 
1988). This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f)(1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court correctly conclude that defendant's 
friend, Aimee Rolfe, was acting as a citizen informant with 
permissive access to the McArthur home when she entered and 
removed certain items from it? 
An appellate court "review[s] the factual findings 
underlying the trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion 
to suppress evidence [under the Fourth Amendment] using a clearly 
1 
erroneous standard. [It] reviewfs] the trial court's conclusions 
of law based on these facts under a correctness standard." State 
v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 854-55 (Utah 1992) (citation omitted). 
2. Assuming arguendo that Rolfe was acting as a government 
agent, as defendant alleges, would her seizure of items from the 
home be fatal to the search warrant affidavit where, omitting all 
reference to the seizure and including all information defendant 
asserts was intentionally omitted, the affidavit nonetheless 
demonstrates probable cause? 
When information is added or excised from an affidavit 
because of a prior illegality, the reviewing court must evaluate 
the affidavit de novo to determine if it will still support a 
finding of probable cause. State v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188, 191 
(Utah 1986). 
3. Where defendant neither argued to the trial court nor 
mentioned in his Sery plea that his post-Miranda confession 
should be suppressed, should he now be permitted to raise the 
issue before this Court for the first time on appeal? 
No standard of review applies where an issue has been 
waived. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
2 
things to be seized. 
U.S. Const. Amend. IV. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with one count each of burglary and 
theft, both second degree felonies, for unlawfully entering and 
removing property from a home in Salt Lake County (R. 3-5). 
After defendant was bound over to district court, he filed a 
motion to suppress the evidence seized pursuant to a warrant he 
claimed was unsupported by probable cause (R. 21, 24-26). The 
trial court denied the motion after an evidentiary hearing (R. 
38, 89-91). Defendant then entered conditional guilty pleas to 
both charges (R. 59-60). The trial court sentenced defendant to 
concurrent terms of one-to-fifteen years in the Utah State 
Prison, which it suspended in favor of twelve months in the Salt 
Lake County jail. The court also imposed a fine and ordered 
various conditions of probation (R. 97-100). Defendant then 
filed a timely notice of appeal (R. 101). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
In early March of 1997, over $200,000 worth of property was 
stolen from a home in Salt Lake County (R. 3-5). Deputy Sheriff 
Vaun Delahunty, an officer with eighteen years of experience, was 
assigned to lead the burglary investigation (R. 114: 3). 
In early June, Delahunty was given the name of a patrol 
deputy who had been in contact with an individual possessing 
3 
"information about one of the big burglaries [Delahunty was] 
working on" (Id. at 27) . Delahunty contacted the deputy, who 
told him that he had picked up a woman named Aimee Rolfe on a 
forgery or credit card charge and that "she had information that 
would — that related to a large burglary that included a lot of 
guns, and that she would be willing to talk . . . about it" (Id. 
at 4-5, 27). Delahunty did not pursue the particulars of the 
forgery or credit card matter, but rather focused his attention 
on the burglary investigation by following up on the Aimee Rolfe 
lead (LdL at 27).l 
Delahunty initially tried to contact Rolfe at an address 
provided by the deputy (Id. at 5). The current residents, 
however, stated that Rolfe had moved and was now living with 
defendant's mother on the east side (Id. at 5-6). They gave 
Delahunty a current telephone number for Rolfe. On June 16th, 
following this lead, Delahunty located Rolfe at the McArthur home 
(Id. at 7, 79). Delahunty testified, "She said that she didn't 
really want to speak there. She was a bit nervous. She would 
talk to me later" (Id. at 7). 
Aimee Rolfe met Delahunty the next day at the sheriff's 
patrol substation (Id. at 8). According to Delahunty, Rolfe 
admitted to him that she had been passing forged checks (Id. at 
1
 Delahunty testified that he had no knowledge of whether 
the forgery matter, which arose out of checks stolen in this 
burglary, had ever been charged against Rolfe (R. 114: 38). 
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42). Expressing no animosity towards defendant, she indicated 
that "she knew that she had done wrong, that she was trying to 
get her life back in order, and was willing to help" (Id. at 34; 
accord id. at 39). 
For his part, Delahunty acknowledged to Rolfe that "there 
could be some heat rolling [her] way on [the forgery matter], but 
[that he didn't] investigate the forgeries" (Id. at 38). In any 
event, he did not know of any ongoing forgery investigation (Id. 
at 25-26). Accordingly, he made clear that "[a]ny help she 
wanted to give me was strictly on her own" (Id. at 38). That is, 
he never indicated that he could help her on any other case that 
might arise, he never offered her money in exchange for 
information, he never promised her anything (Id. at 24, 66). 
Even at the time of the suppression hearing, Delahunty did not 
know whether forgery or any other charges had been pursued 
against Rolfe (Id. at 25-26, 38, 65-66). 
At the police substation, Rolfe told Delahunty about her 
general involvement with defendant and his friends. In addition, 
Delahunty testified, she described the burglary in detail, 
"from the planning, beginning stages, how it happened, when, 
where, what was taken . . . and how it was disposed of and who 
had it" (Id^ . at 8) . 
Specifically, Rolfe said she was at Dominick Newman's house 
on March 3, 1997, late at night. Defendant and Newman announced 
5 
they were "going to work," a euphemism for committing a burglary 
that drew laughter from those present (Id. at 11). Rolfe then 
left the home to go to her job, returning early the next morning 
to find defendant and Newman unloading property - including guns, 
crystal, alcohol, vases, bags, and a computer - from defendant's 
car (Id.). Her detailed descriptions of the property she saw 
them unloading closely matched the descriptions of many items 
taken in the burglary (Id. at 12) .2 Rolfe also told the officer 
about damage to an automatic gate-opening device, describing how 
she had driven Newman to the burglarized home the day after the 
break-in in order to retrieve a bag Newman had left behind (Id. 
at 12-13).3 
Rolfe volunteered to Delahunty that some of the stolen 
property was at defendant's mother's house, where she was living 
at the time (Id. at 15-16). Specifically, "[s]he described a 
Marine Corps combat fighting knife. She described a Rolex watch, 
a Dunhill brand solid gold cigarette lighter, . . . a crystal 
2
 For example, she described "a crystal cookie jar with a 
very unique [sic] gold-plated duck head on it," "very unique 
[sic] Chinese vases, porcelain vases," "handguns . . . 
individually cased with tops and linings, some double sets 
opposed to each other which she referred to as cowboy style 
guns," and "clothing which was neatly pressed and folded" (R. 
114: 12) . 
3
 On about June 19th, to corroborate Rolfe's story, 
Delahunty asked Rolfe to direct him to the burglarized home (R. 
114: 13-14, 17). She did so accurately and without any prompting 
from him (Id. at 13-14). 
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ashtray and crystal cigarette lighter . . . and some . . . 
porcelain dolls" (Id. at 16). 
Sometime between mid-June and the first of July, Rolfe told 
Delahunty that she could retrieve some of the stolen items from 
the McArthur home, specifically mentioning the Marine Corps knife 
and one of the crystal objects, which she said were located in 
defendant's room (Id. at 16-17, 19). She offered to get the 
items when she went by the house to pick up some personal 
property, prior to moving to her mother's home. Delahunty 
responded to Rolfe's offer by saying that it would be great (Id. 
at 19). To the best of Delahunty's knowledge, Rolfe was still 
living in the home when she offered to retrieve the stolen 
property (IdL. at 18) .4 
On June 30th, because Rolfe did not have a car, Delahunty 
met her in West Jordan and drove her to the McArthur home (Id. at 
18, 45).5 At Rolfe's direction, Delahunty, somewhat concerned, 
pulled his vehicle into the driveway. Rolfe reassured him, 
stating, "[T]here's no problem" (Id. at 20). Carrying nothing 
4
 While Delahunty believed that Rolfe was living at the 
McArthur residence, he also thought that "she was staying with a 
friend in West Jordan" because "she was uncomfortable with some 
of [defendant's] behavior" (R. 114: 18). Delahunty thought that 
Rolfe's "overall plan" was to move to her mother's home (Id. at 
19). 
5
 Rolfe told Delahunty that between mid-June and the end of 
the month, she was out of state due to a death in her family (R. 
114: 62, 68-69). 
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and clad only in shorts, a shirt, and sandals, Rolfe went to the 
front door, found it was locked, and then walked around to the 
side of the house, out of sight. She returned to the parked 
police car a few minutes later, carrying a large plastic storage 
bin that contained various personal items, a crystal ashtray, and 
the Marine Corps fighting knife (Id. at 20-21, 22, 47, 65). She 
turned the ashtray and knife over to Delahunty.6 Delahunty then 
dropped Rolfe off at a friend's house and prepared an affidavit 
and a search warrant (Id. at 23, 47) . 
On July 3rd, Delahunty returned to the McArthur residence 
with the authorized search warrant and several detectives. He 
knocked on the front door, heard loud music, walked around to the 
side of the house, knocked on a sliding glass door, opened it, 
announced himself repeatedly, and eventually entered the home and 
followed the music down to the basement, where he found defendant 
and a friend in a bedroom (Id. at 30). Delahunty announced 
himself again and stated that he had a search warrant. Defendant 
did not resist. In the ensuing search, the detectives found many 
items taken from the burglarized home (Id. at 31-32). Defendant 
waived his Miranda rights and admitted his involvement in the 
burglary (Id. at 32-33). 
Because the ashtray measured five-to-six inches in 
diameter and the knife measured about a foot in length, Delahunty 
opined that neither could have been secreted on Rolfe's person 
prior to her entry into the home (R. 114: 21). 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant's central premise is that his friend, Aimee Rolfe, 
was acting as a government agent when she entered his home, took 
two items of stolen property, and then turned them over to the 
police. If this Court determines that Rolfe was not acting as a 
government agent, then the Fourth Amendment has no applicability, 
and this Court can summarily affirm defendant's convictions. 
At the trial court correctly determined, the evidence 
demonstrates no governmental overreaching in this case. While 
the police plainly knew of and acquiesced in Rolfe's decision to 
enter the McArthur home and retrieve certain items, this alone is 
insufficient to render Rolfe a government agent. Other factors 
must be analyzed as well. Rolfe's expressed motivation for 
acting as a citizen informant appeared to be primarily personal. 
In addition, while Rolfe faced criminal charges, the officer in 
this case made clear from the outset that he had nothing to do 
with any charges that might be filed against her. He offered her 
nothing, stating explicitly that any help she provided was 
"strictly on her own." Furthermore, he did not direct or guide 
her activities in any way. Because Rolfe was not acting as an 
agent of the government, the Fourth Amendment does not apply to 
this case. 
Independent of the issue of government agency, neither the 
Fourth Amendment or its exceptions apply to Aimee Rolfe's act of 
9 
entering the McArthur home because the record plainly establishes 
that she enjoyed permissive access to the premises. Thus, even 
if this Court determines that Rolfe was acting as a government 
agent, her permissive entry would not give rise to a Fourth 
Amendment violation. 
Only if this Court determines that Rolfe was a government 
agent must the Court then examine the affidavit supporting the 
search warrant. The State contends that because Rolfe was in the 
home with permission, both her entry and her seizure of stolen 
items in open view were lawful. Even assuming, however, that 
Rolfe unlawfully removed the items, and that all references to 
the removed items were excised from the affidavit, that document 
would nonetheless support the probable cause determination. 
Defendant also argues that the police officer intentionally 
or recklessly omitted material information from the affidavit, 
the inclusion of which would negate probable cause. However, 
defendant ignores the fact that the alleged omissions were 
plainly against Rolfe's own interest. Because she risked 
increased criminal exposure by speaking out, the omitted material 
would have bolstered, rather than undercut, Rolfe's reliability 
as an informant. 
Finally, defendant argues that his post-arrest confession 
must also be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. This 
issue was not preserved, either by raising it before the trial 
10 
court or by specific inclusion in the Sery plea. Consequently, 
it is waived on appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
BECAUSE AIMEE ROLFE WAS NOT ACTING 
AS A GOVERNMENT AGENT, HER ENTRY 
INTO THE MCARTHUR HOME AND REMOVAL 
OF TWO ITEMS FROM IT DID NOT 
IMPLICATE THE FOURTH AMENDMENT; IN 
ANY EVENT, BECAUSE SHE ENJOYED 
PERMISSIVE ACCESS TO THE HOME, HER 
LAWFUL CONDUCT IS NOT SUBJECT TO 
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
Defendant's brief turns on the premise that Aimee Rolfe was 
acting as an agent of the government when she entered the 
McArthur home and removed certain items without a either a 
warrant or justification pursuant to a warrant requirement 
exception. See Br. of App. at 13-21. Because the search warrant 
affidavit arose from this alleged violation of the Fourth 
Amendment, defendant asserts, the search pursuant to the warrant 
must be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. See id. at 
33-34. 
a. Rolfe was not acting as a government agent when she 
entered the McArthur home and removed two stolen items from 
it. 
Defendant's premise that Aimee Rolfe was acting as a 
government agent when she entered the McArthur home and removed 
two items from it forms the linchpin of this case. A 
determination by this Court that Aimee Rolfe was not acting as a 
11 
government agent disposes of defendant's whole case, which is 
based entirely on a Fourth Amendment violation arising out of 
governmental misconduct. 
The legal analysis begins with the fundamental principle 
that the Fourth Amendment protects only against actions of the 
government. The Fourth Amendment does not provide any guarantees 
against unreasonable searches or seizures conducted by private 
citizens. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984); 
Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921). Thus, if a 
private individual conducts a search or seizure, even wrongfully, 
suppression of resulting evidence will not be a remedy, so long 
as the government ultimately acquires the evidence lawfully.7 
Walther v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 656 (1980); State v. 
Newbold, 581 P.2d 991, 992 (Utah 1972). 
The seminal Utah case for analyzing whether an individual is 
acting in a private capacity or as a government agent is State v. 
Watts, 750 P.2d 1219, 1220 (Utah 1988). At the outset, Watts 
makes clear that defendant, as the party objecting to the 
admission of the evidence, must carry the burden of establishing 
that an agency relationship existed between Rolfe and Officer 
7
 This result comports with the deterrent purpose 
underlying the exclusionary rule. See, e.g., State v. Thurman, 
846 P.2d 1256, 1263 (Utah 1993(citations omitted). That is, 
where there is no police misconduct to deter, evidence need not 
be suppressed. Sims v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 841 P.2d 6, 19 
(Utah 1992). 
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Delahunty. Id. at 1221. Because this case, like so many others, 
falls "[i]n the "gray area' between the extremes of overt 
governmental participation in a search and the complete absence 
thereof[,]" it "must be judged according to the nature of the 
governmental participation in the search process and in light of 
all of the facts and circumstances of the case." Id. 
The test for government agency involves two critical areas 
of inquiry: first, whether the government knew of or acquiesed in 
the intrusive conduct; and second, if the government was 
involved, whether the individual's intent and purpose was to 
further law enforcement or to advance the individual's own self-
interest. IcL. at 1221-1222, 1223; State v. Kourv, 824 P.2d 474, 
477 (Utah App. 1991). Factors highlighted by this Court in 
conducting the analysis include the nature of the relationship 
between the actor and the police, whether the actor received 
rewards or compensation for information, and whether the police 
gave the actor direction or guidance for conducting himself. 
Kourv, 824 P.2d at 477 (citing Watts, 750 P.2d at 1222-23).8 
Defendant seeks to expand the Utah test by relying on an 
Iowa case, State v. Cov, 397 N.W.2d 730 (Iowa 1986), rev'd on 
other grounds, Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988), and by testing 
the facts of this case against "the Coy factors". See, e.g., Br. 
of App. at 20-22. While defendant asserts that the Iowa test is 
"essentially the same as the test articulated in Watts," it is 
not. The second Iowa factor, "whether the state, although 
knowing the challenged conduct was occurring or likely to occur, 
did nothing to prevent it," is not part of the Utah analysis. 
Br. of App. at 17 (citations omitted). Utah caselaw nowhere 
articulates a requirement of proactive State intervention in 
13 
In this case, it is undisputed that Officer Delahunty knew 
of and acquiesced in Rolfe's decision to enter the McArthur home 
and retrieve certain items. When Rolfe offered to obtain the 
items at the same time she retrieved some of her own property, 
Delahunty responded by saying, "[TJhat would be great'' (R. 114: 
19). Delahunty also drove Rolfe to the McArthur home in his car 
to get the property, waited in the driveway while she entered the 
home, and accepted two items from her when she returned to the 
car (Id. at 18, 23, 46, 47). These facts alone, however, are not 
dispositive of the agency question. 
The Utah Supreme Court has noted that "law enforcement 
agencies out of necessity rely heavily on informants." Watts, 
750 P.2d at 1221. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has 
emphasized that the Fourth Amendment should not "discourage 
citizens from aiding to the utmost of their ability in the 
apprehension of criminals." Coolidae v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 
443, 488 (1971). Precisely because the police so often work with 
informants, the mere fact that Officer Delahunty did so in this 
case should be insufficient to establish an agency relationship. 
See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 688 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1982); 
United States v. Bulgier, 618 F.2d 472 (7th Cir.), cert, denied, 
449 U.S. 843 (1980); State v. Sanders, 395 S.E.2d 412 (N.C. 
1990), cert, denied, 498 U.S. 1051 (1991); Peters v. State, 393 
order to prevent an agency relationship from arising. 
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S.E.2d 387 (S.C. 1990); People v. Sellars, 417 N.E.2d 877 (111. 
1981). Rather, the inquiry must proceed to an analysis of the 
intent and purpose underlying Rolfe's conduct and to the 
subsidiary issues identified by this Court in Kourv. 
In this case, Rolfe was not shy about revealing her 
motivation for retrieving the items. As background, in talking 
with Officer Delahunty, she described her relationship with 
defendant as "friends," but said that defendant "probably thought 
she was his girlfriend7' (Id. at 25) . Although she expressed 
discomfort with some of defendant's behavior, she demonstrated no 
animosity towards him (Id. at 18, 34). Indeed, she seemed 
primarily concerned with "want[ing] to come clean and get her 
life in order" (Id. at 39). Officer Delahunty testified: "[S]he 
said that she knew she had done wrong, that she was trying to get 
her life back in order, and was willing to help" (Id. at 34).9 
Rolfe, then, was acting for the most part on her own.10 See 
Providing information to the police was, for her, the way 
to make a final break with defendant after a lengthy relationship 
and so to get a fresh start. 
10
 Certainly, it would be difficult to assert that Rolfe's 
conduct was motivated either purely by self-interest or purely by 
a desire to aid law enforcement. Any unarticulated desire to 
have defendant apprehended, however, seems subsidiary to her 
expressed self-interest and, in any event, would be insufficient 
by itself to render her a government agent under Watts. "Where 
the government has offered an informant no form of compensation 
for his or her efforts, ^personal motives in fact are likely to 
be mixed with the desire to help the authorities.'" Kourv, 824 
P.2d at 478 n.2 (quoting United States v. Bazan, 807 F.2d 1200, 
1204 (5th Cir. 1986), cert, denied 481 U.S. 1038 (1987)). 
15 
Watts, 750 P.2d at 1223. 
Furthermore, Officer Delahunty did not direct or guide 
Rolfe's conduct in any significant way. While Delahunty 
initially contacted Rolfe, he did so only after Rolfe herself had 
volunteered information about the burglary to another police 
officer (R. 114: 4, 39).n Rolfe subsequently appeared of her 
own volition at the police station to disclose what she knew 
about the burglary and, later, voluntarily directed Delahunty to 
the McArthur home (Id. at 8, 18-20). 
Described by Officer Delahunty as "brash, forthright, [and] 
outspoken," Rolfe was very much in control of how events 
unfolded. Initially, she chose to describe several of the 
unique, stolen items in detail (Id. at 12). She subsequently 
told Delahunty precisely which items she could and could not 
obtain and why (Id. at 19, 24-25, 67). Of Rolfe's leadership 
role in retrieving the items from the McArthur home, Delahunty 
testified: 
I was kind of nervous about the situation. 
Aimee directed me to pull right in the 
driveway. I questioned whether she wanted me 
to do that, and she said, "Yes, there's no 
problem." I pulled into the driveway. She 
said, "Wait here." She left my vehicle and 
walked into the house. 
(Id. at 20). Rolfe returned five or ten minutes later with a 
11
 Rolfe told another officer about the burglary after she 
had been picked up on forgery charges. Delahunty received the 
information third hand (R. 114: 4-5, 26-27). 
16 
large Tupperware storage bin containing some of her personal 
property and two of the stolen items (Id. at 21). Rolfe informed 
Delahunty that defendant and his niece were at home and that 
defendant had lit a cigarette for her with a stolen lighter while 
she was inside (Id. at 22, 66-67). She then turned the two 
stolen items over to Delahunty (Id. at 23, 47). 
Nor did Officer Delahunty make any offers of reward or 
otherwise entice Rolfe to cooperate. Indeed, while Rolfe had 
been picked up on related forgery charges, Delahunty clarified to 
her at the outset that he had nothing to do with those charges 
and could offer her no help should charges be filed against her. 
He testified, "I told Aimee, I think my exact words were, *Aimee, 
you know fully well there could be some heat rolling your way on 
this, but I don't investigate the forgeries, I don't even know 
where the forgeries occurred'" (Id. at 38). His testimony 
continued, "Any help she wanted to give me was strictly on her 
own" (Id.). Delahunty also explicitly stated that he offered her 
no compensation in exchange for her help (Id. at 24). Prior to 
this incident, Delahunty had never used Aimee Rolfe as an 
informant. Indeed, he had never even met her (Id. at 71). 
Because Rolfe's motivation was primarily personal and 
because Officer Delahunty neither directed her conduct nor 
offered her anything in exchange for her help, it is fair to 
conclude that Rolfe's actions were not "substantially motivated 
17 
by the prompting and encouragement of the [police]." Watts, 750 
P.2d at 1223. The trial court entered findings and conclusions 
.to this effect, which the record supports.12 Under such 
circumstances, defendant has failed to carry his burden of 
establishing an agency relationship between Rolfe and the police. 
Because Aimee Rolfe was not acting as a government agent 
when she entered the home and removed the items, the Fourth 
Amendment has no applicability to this case. Consequently, since 
a Fourth Amendment violation constitutes the essential basis of 
this appeal, defendant's argument fails and his convictions 
should be affirmed. 
b. Rolfe enjoyed permissive access to the McArthur home. 
Independent of the issue of government agency, neither the 
Fourth Amendment nor its exceptions apply to Aimee Rolfe's act of 
entering the McArthur home because the record plainly establishes 
that she enjoyed permissive access to the premises. 
Consequently, even if this Court determines that Rolfe was acting 
as a government agent, her entry and lawful taking of items from 
the home would not give rise to a Fourth Amendment violation. 
This Court's legal reasoning in State v. Koury, 824 P.2d 474 
(Utah App. 1991) controls. In Koury, the Court determined that 
12
 The trial court both "found" and "concluded" that Rolfe 
"was a citizen informant." R. 90-91 or addendum A. Properly, 
the determination is a conclusion of law, supported by the record 
facts cited in this brief. 
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an individual acted lawfully when, with permissive access to 
defendant's home, he took cocaine residue from the home and 
turned it over to the police. He had not engaged in "intrusive 
conduct" because he "had permission to be in defendant's home and 
was there at defendant's request." Kourv, 824 P.2d at 478. The 
court stated: "It is not illegal for a private individual, even 
if acting as a government agent, to enter another's home if he or 
she does so with the owner's permission." Id. (citing United 
States v. Bennett, 709 F.2d 803, 806 (1983) aff'd, 729 F.2d 923 
(2d Cir.) cert, denied 469 U.S. 1075 (1984). Similarly, here, 
where Rolfe had permissive access to the home, her entry did not 
constitute a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 
The trial court found that Rolfe "had habitually come and 
gone from the McArthur residence" and "had permission to be in 
the McArthur residence on June 30, 1997".13 See R. 90 at 
addendum A. The record evidence supports these findings. 
First, defendant's mother testified that she owned the home. 
She had never given Rolfe explicit permission to move in, but 
over time Rolfe gradually had moved in, residing in the home with 
defendant for some time prior to his arrest (R. 114: 78-79). The 
13
 Defendant argues at length that the trial court's 
determination that Rolfe was living at the home on June 30th was 
clearly erroneous. See Br. of App. at 27-30. The critical 
question, however, is not whether Rolfe was actually residing in 
the home, but whether she had permissive access to it. Thus, the 
court's determination about her residence, regardless of its 
accuracy, is not dispositive. 
19 
mother testified, ''Well, did I say, xAimee, you can move in' ? 
No, I didn't. But she stayed overnight, and kind of just 
continued to stay overnight there" (Id. at 81). Eventually, the 
mother testified, "I thought they probably split up . . . [and 
Rolfe] moved out of the house" (Id. at 81-82) . Nonetheless, 
"[Rolfe] still came back once in a while. . . . She's kind of 
been like that for years" (Id. at 82). According to defendant's 
mother, Rolfe had been in the home off and on "[f]or about ten 
years" (Id.). She also testified that Rolfe, like some of 
defendant's other friends, could have come into the home without 
her explicit invitation but with defendant's permission, since he 
was also living there (Id. at 84).14 
Second, based exclusively on what Rolfe told him, Officer 
Delahunty testified about his understanding of Rolfe's 
relationship to the McArthur household (Id. at 51) .15 In mid-
June, Rolfe indicated to Delahunty that she had access to the 
McArthur home: "She told me she was living there" (Id. at 19).16 
14
 Defendant did not testify. 
15
 Notwithstanding Delahunty's knowledge that Rolfe may 
have committed a crime of dishonesty by forging checks, he found 
that the information she conveyed "was extremely detailed, and it 
keyed and dovetailed into everything I knew and understood about 
the burglary" (Id. at 70). Consequently, based on his first-hand 
experience with Rolfe, Delahunty determined that she was credible 
(Id. at 52) . 
16
 She also told Delahunty that she was staying in West 
Jordan with a friend at the time (Id. at 18). 
20 
He explained: 
She said she had some of her personal 
property that she needed to pick up pending 
her move to her mother's home. She had some 
of her property she needed to get. . . . I 
can't recall her exact conversation as to 
whether she was moving out. Her overall plan 
was to move back with her mother at some 
point in time, and her personal property and 
belongings were at the McArthur residence. 
(IcL) 
Two weeks later, Rolfe still had access to the home. Based 
on conversations with her, Delahunty believed "that she lived 
there, that she was staying there, living there on and off" (Id. 
at 52).17 Delahunty's first-hand experience with Rolfe in going 
to the McArthur home on June 30th confirmed what Rolfe had told 
him about having access to the home. Rolfe's openness in 
directing Delahunty to pull right into the driveway, her easy 
access into the home, and her breezy announcement that defendant 
had lit her cigarette with a stolen lighter while she was inside, 
all confirmed Delahunty's belief that Rolfe had permission to be 
in the home. Indeed, Delahunty testified that he had absolutely 
no reason to believe that Rolfe had anything but free access to 
the house (Id. at 23, 66). 
The trial court found that Rolfe had access to the McArthur 
17
 Rolfe apparently did not enjoy a single, stable, 
permanent residence anywhere. Rather, she seems to have lived in 
various places at various times, including the McArthur home, an 
apartment in West Jordan, her mother's home, and a trailer in 
West Jordan (R. 114: 76). 
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home. The record evidence supports those findings, and defendant 
has failed to demonstrate clear error in the findings.18 
Consequently, this Court should conclude that, because Rolfe 
enjoyed permissive entry to the home, her entry was lawful, 
regardless of whether or not she was functioning as a government 
agent at the time. 
POINT TWO 
EVEN IF THIS COURT DETERMINED THAT 
ROLFE WAS ACTING AS A GOVERNMENT 
AGENT, THAT DETERMINATION WOULD NOT 
BE FATAL TO THE VALIDITY OF THE 
AFFIDAVIT: WITH ALL REFERENCES TO 
AN ALLEGEDLY IMPROPER SEIZURE 
EXCISED AND ALL ALLEGEDLY OMITTED 
INFORMATION INCLUDED, THE AFFIDAVIT 
STILL SUPPORTS PROBABLE CAUSE TO 
SEARCH 
Defendant argues that because the affidavit supporting the 
search warrant was based largely on a government agent's initial 
unlawful search and seizure, the evidence seized later by police 
when they entered the home pursuant to the warrant must be 
suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. See Br. of App. at 
33-34. The Court need only reach this argument if it determines 
that Rolfe was acting as a government agent.19 
18
 Based on its findings, the trial court concluded that 
Rolfe "had a right to enter the McArthur home" (R. 91 at addendum 
A) . 
19
 If she was not acting as a government agent, then her 
acts of giving information and property to the police implicate 
neither the Fourth Amendment nor its remedy of suppression. See 
Watts, 750 P.2d at 1220. Under such circumstances, defendant's 
22 
a. Even omitting all references to the seizure of the 
ashtray and knife, the affidavit still supports the probable 
cause determination. 
Assuming arguendo that Rolfe was a government agent, her 
entry was nonetheless lawful because, as has been explained, she 
enjoyed permissive access to the McArthur home.20 Her subsequent 
acts of seizing the Marine Corps fighting knife and the crystal 
ashtray were also lawful. No allegation has been made that she 
removed the objects from an area of the home that was restricted 
to her. To the contrary, she told Officer Delahunty that the 
crystal ashtray and knife were located in the bedroom, which she 
shared with defendant (R. 114: 16, 80). Both because the items 
were in open view and because defendant could not claim any 
possessory interest in stolen property, Rolfe's act of removing 
them along with her own personal property did not offend the 
Fourth Amendment. See Koury, 824 P.2d at 476. 
Even assuming arguendo, however, that Rolfe unlawfully 
removed the items, such a reading of the facts would not be fatal 
to the State's case. If Rolfe unlawfully removed property from 
the home and the police included information about that removal 
in the affidavit, then that information would be excised and the 
remedy for Rolfe's entry into the home without permission would 
lie in an action for trespass. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-206. 
20
 Even defendant concedes that "McArthur allowed [Rolfe] 
inside as a guest." Br. of App. at 42. See also supra Point 
I.b. 
23 
remaining portions of the affidavit evaluated for probable cause. 
See State v. Viah. 871 P.2d 1030, 1033 (Utah App. 1994) (after 
.stale information excised, affidavit still remained viable). Of 
course, only the references to Rolfe's seizure of the two items 
taken from the home should be excised. Her observations of what 
she saw inside the home would rightfully be included in the 
affidavit because she had permission to be there. That is, 
observations of items in open view in an area where a person has 
a right to be are properly included in an affidavit. See State 
v. Belaard, 840 P.2d 819, 823 n.4 (Utah App. 1992).21 
In this case, even if Rolfe's seizure of the two items is 
omitted from the search warrant affidavit, the remaining 
information would nonetheless demonstrate that "the issuing 
magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that there were 
enough facts within the affidavit to find that probable cause 
existed." State v. Collard, 810 P.2d 884, 885 (Utah App. 1989). 
In relevant part, the affidavit, with all reference to 
Rolfe's removal of the fighting knife and ashtray deleted, would 
21
 Thus, the single scenario under which defendant could 
prevail in his quest for suppression is if this Court determines 
both that Rolfe was acting as a government agent and that she 
entered the home without permission. In that case, everything 
Rolfe observed inside the home on June 30th would have to be 
excised from the affidavit. Because the remaining information, 
dating back several months, would likely be considered stale, it 
would provide an inadequate basis for finding probable cause. 
See, e.g., Viah, 871 P.2d at 1033 (stale information cannot be 
sole basis for determining probable cause exists). 
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read: 
Ms. Aimee Rolfe told your affiant that during 
the first part of March 1997, she was with 
Michael Todd McArthur and Dominic Newman when 
they said that they were "going to work." The 
next morning when Aimee went back to Mr. 
Newman's residence, she observed the two men 
unloading numerous items of personal property 
from Dominic's vehicle into his residence. 
The next day Dominic Newman took Aimee to the 
house where they had obtained the property, 
which is Mr. Clark's residence. . . . On June 
30, 1997, Aimee went to Mr. McArthur's 
residence located at 2802 East 3900 South, 
Salt Lake City, Utah. . . . Aimee has seen a 
. . . crystal ashtray[22] on . . . [an] . . . 
entertainment shelf and two Lladro figurines 
in the home on 30 June 1997. Aimee observed 
the defendant in possession of a solid gold 
Dunhill brand cigarette lighter. On 30 June 
1997, she used it to light up a cigarette. 
Mr. Clark has reported missing from his home 
Lladro figurines, a Waterford crystal ashtray 
and a Dunhill sold gold cigarette lighter. 
State's exhibit #1 or addendum B. 
The information contained in this affidavit forms an 
adequate basis for a "reasonable common sense belief" that stolen 
property would be found in the McArthur home. State v. 
Strombera, 783 P.2d 54, 57 (Utah App. 1989). The affidavit 
communicated that Rolfe was with defendant when he and Newman 
announced they were "going to work." This euphemism, appearing 
22
 The reference to the ashtray is mistaken. It should 
read "crystal lighter," since Rolfe had taken the crystal ashtray 
from the home prior to the preparation of the affidavit. What 
remained in the home was the crystal lighter that matched the 
ashtray. See R. 114: 58-59 (discussing the transposition). The 
search warrant reflects the same error. 
25 
in quotation marks as a cue to an unusual or special connotation, 
is not explained. The meaning of the phrase, however, emerges 
from the context of other facts cited in the affidavit. That is, 
the affidavit reflected that Rolfe observed defendant and Newman 
unloading property from a vehicle the next morning and that 
Newman later took Rolfe to the Clark home, from which the 
property had been taken. Plainly, in context, "going to work" 
referred to the burglary of the Clark home.23 
The affidavit also reflects that Rolfe had personally 
observed a crystal ashtray,24 two Lladro figurines, and a gold 
Dunhill cigarette lighter in the McArthur home. The homeowner 
had described three such items as stolen from his home. 
Certainly, a common-sense interpretation of this information 
would lead a magistrate to believe there was a fair probability 
that the property Rolfe saw in the McArthur home was the same 
stolen property the homeowner had described, that it had come 
from the "work" done by defendant and Newman, and that it would 
be found in the McArthur residence. Consequently, even omitting 
the information relating to Rolfe's removal of the knife and the 
ashtray from the home, the affidavit is nonetheless sufficient to 
demonstrate probable cause. 
23
 Delahunty testified that he orally explained the meaning 
of "going to work" to the magistrate when he presented the 
affidavit and warrant for authorization (R. 114: 57). 
24
 See footnote 24. 
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b. With all purportedly omitted information included, the 
affidavit still supports the probable cause determination. 
Defendant also argues that the affidavit supporting the 
search warrant was fatally flawed due to material omissions by 
Officer Delahunty. Had the omitted information been included, he 
asserts, the veracity and reliability of Rolfe's statements would 
have been so undercut as to defeat the probable cause 
determination. See Br. of App. at 37-43. Specifically, 
defendant argues that the affidavit should have revealed that 
Rolfe had been picked up for forging checks stolen in the 
burglary; that she was a possible suspect in the burglary and 
faced potential charges of forgery and receiving stolen property; 
that her contact with Delahunty arose out of her forgeries; and 
that Delahunty facilitated her retrieval of stolen items from the 
McArthur home. See Br. of App. at 37-38. 
The law in Utah is well-settled that "a defendant must 
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that material 
information has been intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly 
omitted, and, [sic] that with the omitted information inserted, 
the affidavit does not support probable cause." State v. Lee, 
863 P.2d 49, 55 (Utah App. 1993) (citing State v. Neilsen, 727 
P.2d 188, 191 (Utah 1986)). However, when the additional facts, 
if they had been known to the magistrate issuing the search 
warrant, would still have resulted in a finding of probable 
cause, evidence will not be suppressed. Neilsen, 727 P.2d at 
27 
191.25 
In this case, defendant's argument fails at the outset 
because even had the purported omissions been included in the 
affidavit, they would not have defeated probable cause. The 
trial court so determined: xx[t]here were no material omissions 
made which would render the search warrant invalid." R. 91 at 
addendum A. This determination is correct. 
Defendant argues that Rolfe's involvement in a crime of 
dishonesty would have fatally undermined her reliability as an 
informant and that the nature of Delahunty's relationship with 
her would inexorably have led to the conclusion that she was a 
police informant. 
Defendant, however, ignores the reality that by voluntarily 
revealing the details of her personal knowledge and involvement 
to Officer Delahunty, Rolfe increased her own criminal exposure. 
When Rolfe directed Delahunty to the burglarized home and 
provided a detailed itemization of stolen items she had seen, she 
was in fact corroborating her criminal involvement to Officer 
Delahunty. Cf. State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099, 1102 (Utah 
1985) (finding the "verification of significant facts" from the 
The Utah Supreme Court, adopting the reasoning 
articulated in Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), has 
declared that "[d]eterrence of police misconduct is not to be a 
factor in the decision to suppress unless the misconduct 
materially affects the finding of probable cause." Neilsen, 727 
P.2d at 191. 
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informant's statement bolsters credibility). Given that 
Delahunty had clarified to Rolfe at the outset that any 
information she provided was "strictly on her own" and that he 
had made no promises of any kind to her, Rolfe had nothing to 
gain by admitting knowledge of the burglary and thus 
demonstrating her personal involvement in the crime.26 
Consequently, her statements against her own interest would have 
bolstered her credibility rather than undercut it. See State v. 
Sanders, 496 P.2d 270, 273 (Utah 1972)(admission of defendant's 
statement bolsters credibility because "experience teaches that 
it is unlikely he would so declare unless it were true'') . 
As to defendant's assertion that Rolfe was a police 
informant, the record evidence simply fails to support this 
conclusion. See supra Point l.a. Because Rolfe was not a 
government agent, information relevant to that determination is 
immaterial to the affidavit. 
Furthermore, defendant has failed to persuasively 
demonstrate that Officer Delahunty's purported omissions were 
either reckless or intentional. In his testimony, Delahunty 
unequivocally stated that he had no contact whatsoever with Rolfe 
concerning the forgery or credit card matter on which she was 
Rolfe articulated what she believed to be her intangible 
personal interest in revealing what she knew. That is, she told 
Delahunty that "she wanted to come clean and get her life in 
order" (R. 114: 39). 
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originally picked up by the police (R. 114: 5, 27). Even at the 
time of the suppression hearing, he had no idea if those charges 
.had ever been pursued (Id. at 38). Because he had promised Rolfe 
nothing and because he had no contact with her other than as an 
informant in this burglary, he saw no reason to disclose what he 
deemed to be information irrelevant to the affidavit. 
Because the purportedly omitted information would more 
likely have bolstered the probable cause determination than 
defeated it, defendant's assertion that the officer intentionally 
omitted material information from the affidavit must fail. 
POINT THREE 
ANY ISSUE RELATED TO DEFENDANT'S 
CONFESSION IS WAIVED BY HIS FAILURE 
TO PRESERVE IT BEFORE THE TRIAL 
COURT OR IN HIS SERY PLEA; EVEN ON 
THE MERITS, HIS POST-ARREST 
STATEMENTS NEED ONLY BE CONSIDERED 
SHOULD THIS COURT FIRST FIND THAT 
ROLFE WAS A GOVERNMENT AGENT WHO 
ENTERED THE HOME WITHOUT 
PERMISSION, OR THAT THE AFFIDAVIT 
WAS SO DEFECTIVE AS TO INVALIDATE 
THE SEARCH WARRANT 
Finally, defendant argues that his post-arrest, post-Miranda 
confession must be suppressed because it was not attenuated from 
either Rolfe's misconduct as a government agent or Officer 
Delahunty's misconduct in omitting material information from the 
affidavit. See Br. of App. at 43-46. Because defendant never 
raised this issue below, the trial court was not accorded an 
opportunity to rule upon it. Consequently, barring plain error 
30 
or exceptional circumstances, neither of which have been asserted 
here, it is waived on appeal. State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 
1311 (1987). Additionally, defendant failed to preserve the 
matter in his Sery plea. His plea specifically states that, 
pursuant to Sery, defendant preserves only "the issue of the 
legality of the search warrant for appeal" (R. 51). See also R. 
115: 1-2, 5. Consequently, the issue is twice waived. 
Even on the merits, this issue could only be reached if this 
Court first determines either that Rolfe was acting as a 
government agent who entered the McArthur home without permission 
or that the search warrant affidavit was so defective as to 
invalidate the probable cause determination. 
In the first instance, if Rolfe was a government agent who 
intruded into the McArthur home, then both her entry into the 
home and her seizure of property would violate the Fourth 
Amendment. Consequently, the warrant would constitute the fruit 
of the poisonous tree and the search warrant that depended on it 
would be invalid. 
In the second instance, if the affidavit was rendered 
invalid by the information Officer Delahunty did not include in 
it, then the search warrant would also be invalid. Rolfe's 
observations of what she saw inside the home would rightfully be 
included in the affidavit because she had permission to be there. 
That is, observations of items in open view in an area where a 
31 
person has a right to be are properly included in an affidavit. 
See State v. Belaard, 840 P.2d 819, 823 n.4 (Utah App. 1992).27 
The State asserts neither of these arguments has merit. See 
supra Points I and II. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's 
second degree felony convictions for theft and burglary. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 5^day of May, 1999. 
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 Thus, the single scenario under which defendant could 
prevail in his quest for suppression is if this Court determines 
both that Rolfe was acting as a government agent and that she 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH, 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, DIVISION I 
STATE OF UTAH, : DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED FINDINGS 
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiff, : 
v. : 
MICHAEL TODD MCARTHUR, : Case No. 971901299FS 
JUDGE HOMER F. WILKINSON 
Defendant. : 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
This matter came before the Honorable F. Wilkinson on December 22,1997 
on Defendant's Motion to Suppress the Evidence. The plaintiff, the State of Utah was 
represented by Richard G. Hamp, and the defendant, Michael Todd McArthur was 
represented by Rebecca C. Hyde. Testimony was received by this Court and arguments 
presented by counsel. Based upon the foregoing, this Court makes the following 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
MAR 2 7 1998 
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Ttopury CI or K 
0 0 0 0 S 0 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Aimee Rolfe had permission to be in the Mcarthur residence on June 
30, 1997. 
2. Aimee Rolfe had habitually come and gone from the McArthur 
residence. 
3- Aimee Rolfe was living at the McArthur residence on June 30,1997. 
4. The Defendant, Michael McArthur expected and was aware that Ms. 
Rolfe freely came and went to and from the residence. 
5. Aimee Rolfe had a right to enter and leave the McArthur house on 
June 30, 1997. 
6. Aimee Rolfe was a citizen informant. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Though additional information could have been included, the search 
warrant was supported by probable cause. 
2. There were no material omissions made which would render the 
search warrant invalid. 
3. Aimee Rolfe was a citizen informant who had a right to enter the 
McArthur home. 
DATED this J~f day of February, 1998. 
BY THE COURT: 
/OUDGE HOMER F. WILKINSON 
'Third District Court, Division I 
MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the office of the District 
Attorney, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 this day of February, 
1998. 
ADDENDUM B 
E. NEAL GUNNARSON 
DISTRICT ATTORNEY 
RODWICKE YBARRA, Bar No. 4184 
DEPUTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY 
231 E. 400 SOUTH 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 3637900 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
BEFORE: Michael L. Hutchings 450 South 200 East 
MAGISTRATE ADDRESS 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
County of Salt Lake ) 
The undersigned affiant, Vaun Delahunty, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
That your affiant has reason to believe 
That on the person of Michael Todd McArthur 
and/or 
on the premises known as 2802 East 3900 South 
In the City of Salt Lake City, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, there is now certain property or 
evidence described as: 
1. Waterford Crystal Ashtray 
2. Various Lladro porcelain statues 
3. Gold Dunhill cigarette lighter 
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and that said property or evidence: 
was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed, or 
consists of an item of, or constitutes evidence of, illegal conduct, possessed by a party to 
the illegal conduct, or 
consists of an item of, or constitutes evidence of, illegal conduct, possessed by a person 
or entity not a party to the illegal conduct. 
Affiant believes the property and evidence described above is evidence of the crime or crimes of 
Burglary, Theft and Theft by Receiving Stolen Property. 
The facts to establish the grounds for issuance of a Search Warrant are: 
Your affiant is a Detective with the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office currently assigned 
to the Burglary Investigations Unit. Your affiant has been a Deputy Sheriff for 18 years and has 
spent the last two years working specifically with burglary and theft investigations. 
Ms. Dorothy Gant, the housekeeper for Mr. Michael Clark, who resides at 2550 East 
Brentwood Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah, has told your affiant that on 3 March 1997 she checked 
on Mr. Clark's residence while he was out of town and found everything to be in order. On 4 
March 1997, she returned and found the house to be ransacked and numerous items of Mr. 
Clark's personal property, including numerous guns, computers, electronics, ait objects, clothing, 
tools, alcohol, crystal, figurines, silverware, a Ford Bronco automobile and other items missing. 
Ms. Aimee Rolfe told your affiant that during the first part of March 1997, she was with 
Michael Todd McArthur and Dominic Newman when they said that they were "going to work." 
The next morning when Aimee went back to Mr. Newman's residence, she observed the two men 
unloading numerous items of personal property from Dominic's vehicle into his residence. The 
next day Dominic Newman took Aimee to the house where they had obtained the property, 
which is Mr. Clark's residence. On 30 June 1997, Aimee went to Mr. McArthur's residence 
located at 2802 East 3900 South, Salt Lake City, Utah. There she obtained a Kbar Marine 
Fighting Knife in a distinctive leather sheath from Michael Todd McArthur's bedroom and a 
Waterford Crystal cigarette lighter from the an entertainment center shelf in the front room of the 
residence and gave them to your affiant. Mr. Clark has identified these items as being among 
those stolen in the above-described burglary. Aimee has seen a matching crystal ashtray on the 
above-mentioned entertainment shelf and two Lladro figurines in the home on 30 June 1997. 
Aimee observed the defendant in possession of a solid gold Dunhill brand cigarette lighter. On 
30 June 1997, she used it to light up a cigarette. Mr. Clark has reported missing from his home 
Lladro figurines, a Waterford crystal ashtray and a Dunhill solid gold cigarette lighter. 
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WHEREFORE, your affiant prays that a Search Warrant be issued for the seizure of said items: 
in the daytime. 
Vaun Delahunty 
AFFIANT 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this / day of July, 1997 
% > ^ ' 
3ttELL.'nUTCIIINGS -
MAGISTRATE ^ * 
